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Introduction 
 
Georg Bertram recently argued that a consistent and accomplished philosophy of 
art should consider not only the specific nature of art, but also its value as human practice. 
Following this line of reasoning, I will defend that “art” may be a particular way to look 
at and to develop human practices and that the link between human practices and art is 
provided by improvisation.  
Improvisation is not only a particular artistic technique. Improvisation 
incorporates and genetically shows the specificity of autonomous art as well as the value 
of art, that is, the link between human practices and art as a specific human practice. 
Indeed, as I will explain, art both derives from and is a particular way to improvise (upon) 
human practices, i.e. to develop them in unprecedented and valuable ways. Accordingly, 
improvisation, as a specific artistic procedure, will be understood as that kind of artistic 
                                                             
• Different versions of this paper have been discussed in different languages at the conference Autonomía 
y valor del arte (Granada, Spain, March 2017) with the title Value and autonomy of improvisation. Between art and 
practices (and will be published in Spanish) and at the 13th International Congress of Aesthetics – “Os fins da arte” 
(Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais Belo Horizonte, 17.-20.10.2017; it will be published in Portuguese). 
Another different version has been published in Italian with the title Valore e autonomia dell’improvvisazione. 
Tra arti e pratiche in the online journal “Kaiak.  
A Philosophical Journey”, 3 (2016). The text presented here, with the title echoing Friedrich Nietzsches 
Die Geburt der Tragödie aus dem geist der Musik, includes also material from my talk on Improvisation and Ontology 
of Art presented at the workshop L’expérience esthétique comme « praxis » : perception, imagination et atmosphères 
(Paris, March, 22. 2018). I thank all participants at the mentioned meetings (and, especially, Georg 
Bertram, Federico Vercellone, Gerard Vilar, Stefen Deines, José Zuñiga, Giorgia Cecchinato, Walter 
Menon, André J. Abath, Tonino Griffero) for their precious comments and questions. 
•• University of Turin, Italy. 
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production in which the human practices art is based in come, as it were, exemplarily to 
the fore. 
Hence, improvisation can be understood as the paradigm of art as human 
practice: as I shall suggest, art begins with, and ends in, improvisation. 
 
1. The paradigmatic normativity of improvisation 
 
In the book Kunst als menschliche Praxis1 Georg Bertram resorts to artistic 
improvisation to illustrate a characteristic aspect of the constitution of artworks: the self-
referential relations implied in the artworks and shaping the artworks do not result from 
an alleged closure of the artwork’s form, but are negotiated locally, in relation to each 
individual artwork. The example provided by Bertram is the interplay between 
improvising musicians and their interaction with the attending audience. These interplay 
and interaction are responsible for the aesthetic normativity of the performance. 
Although standards of artistic value are assumed before the musical performance, in 
accordance with the musical genre and the style of the musicians, they can also change 
during the development of the performance itself. The way musicians react to what 
others play and, more generally, the way performers cope with unpredictable 
performance situations produces the sense of the performance, that is, the normativity of 
that specific performance2. This amounts to saying that the normativity of the 
performance does not only regulate what is happening within the performance, but 
emerges from what happens. In other words, normativity is open, rather than fixed, 
because it is constitutively moving along with the concrete development of the 
performance. In this sense, as showed by Richard Keith Sawyer’s research on the topic, 
improvisation, and especially interactive improvisation, is like a conversation3: in fact, the 
                                                             
1 G. BERTRAM, Kunst als menschliche Praxis. Eine Ästhetik, Berlin, Suhrkamp 2014. Cf. A. BERTINETTO, “Do 
not fear mistakes – there are none” – The mistake as surprising experience of creativity in jazz, in M. Santi, E. Zorzi 
(eds.), Education as Jazz, Cambridge, Cambridge Scholars Publishing 2016, pp. 85-100. 
2 Cf. A. BERTINETTO, Formatività ricorsiva e costruzione della normatività nell’improvvisazione, in A. Sbordoni 
(ed.), Improvvisazione oggi, Lucca, LIM 2014, pp. 15-28; A. BERTINETTO, Jazz als Gelungene Performance. 
Ästhetische Normativität und Improvisation, in “Zeitschrift für Ästhetik und allgemeine Kunstwissenschaft”, 
59/1 (2014), pp. 105-140; A. BERTINETTO, Eseguire l’inatteso. Ontologia della musica e improvvisazione Roma, il 
Glifo 2016. 
3 Cf. R. K. SAWYER, Creating Conversations. Improvisation in Everyday Discourse, Cresskill New Jersey, Hampton 
Press 2001 e Improvised Dialogues: Emergence and Creativity in Conversation, Westport, CT, Ablex 2003. 
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meaning of a conversation does not depend only from contextual constraints and from 
speakers’ intentions, but emerges out through speakers’ actual interactions.  
Now, the very same way the normativity of a collective improvised performance 
is established by and within the performance – accordingly to the development of the 
interplay between musicians, in relation to the specific situation of its occurrence, and 
through the reactions to the audience’s feedbacks –, the normativity of an artwork does 
not depend uniquely on the criteria and on the norms of a given artistic practice or of a 
given artistic genre. It rather ‘grows’ from the inside out of the artwork itself. However, 
this does not mean that the artwork is closed. On the contrary, the artwork is open, 
because its meaning and its cultural identity depend on receivers’ interpretive activities 
and because, as cultural construct, it retroactively influences the art genre or the practice 
it refers and/or it belongs to4. So one may say that the artwork (including both its internal 
formal and material relations and the received interpretations and meanings) is a kind of 
improvisation which signifies5 on an artistic practice (or artistic genre) that (trans)forms 
itself thanks to the new – emergent and unexpected – artwork. In other words, the 
development of an artistic genre or practice is improvisational, because each artwork is 
ex improviso in relation to a given established artistic tradition6.  
Let me explain a bit what I mean with this. Alva Noë observes in this regard that 
certain artworks contribute to the transformation of the criteria of art evaluation7. 
Following Georg Bertram8, I think that this thesis must be radicalized: all artworks, as 
such, contribute to (trans)form the criteria of art (and, also, artistic genres) and precisely 
this is the reason why general classificatory definitions of the essence of art in terms of 
sufficient and necessary conditions do not work. Moreover, this is why Kendall Walton’s 
famous thesis that, in order to evaluate an artwork correctly, we must properly put it in 
                                                             
4 On this subject cf. the already mentioned book of G. Bertram, Kunst als menschliche Praxis as well as A. 
Noë’s recent book Strange tools. Art and human nature, New York, Farrar, Straus and Giroux 2015. Noë’s 
approach is indebted to John DEWEY’s Art as Experience (New York, Putnam, 1934). 
5 “Signifying” means the appropriative re-semantization of cultural production and the word is used 
especially in relation to the Afro-American culture. Cf. H. L. GATES JR., The signifying monkey: A theory of 
African-American literary criticism, Oxford-New York, Oxford University Press 1988; I. MONSON, Saying 
something. Jazz improvisation and interaction, Chicago-London, The University of Chicago Press 1996. 
6 Cf. A. BERTINETTO, Ex Improviso, Trans-Formation als Modell künstlerischer Praxis, in K. Maar, F. Ruda, J. 
Völker (eds.), Generische Formen, Bielefeld, Transcript, 2017, pp. 143-157. 
7 NOË, Strange tools, p. 229. 
8 BERTRAM, Kunst als menschliche Praxis. 
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the right artistic category is too partial and mistaken9. Artistic categories (genres, styles, 
traditions…) are actual and real only through concrete artworks and artistic practices 
(including interpretive and critical activities) that emerge out of such categories as 
unforeseen events that re-shape them. Therefore I endorse Joseph Margolis’ view of 
artworks as culturally emergent and physically embodied constructs10. A brief discussion of what 
this means and implies may be helpful here. 
As Peter Lamarque clearly explains, the point is that, in order to exist, artworks 
need to be put in the world as something new, i.e. as product of creative human action. 
Moreover, in order to (continue to) be what they are, artworks also need «a complex 
cultural background of practices»11, «appropriate beliefs, attitudes, modes of appreciation, 
and expectations»12: 
 
Nothing can be a work (of art) if it does not play a role, or be fit to play a 
role, in a human practice where a sufficient number of informed practitioners 
recognize its status and respond appropriately.13 
 
Yet, practices, cultural contexts and their normative force are flexible and can 
change14: hence, since their identity depends on practices, artworks change or disappear, 
when the relevant practices change or disappear.  
Once having acknowledged this, and rightly so, unfortunately Lamarque follows 
Walton’s shortcoming, and observes that «we need to place the work in its proper 
category»15. So, accordingly to the general principle “no identity without evaluation”, 
judgements of value make ontological identification possible, but, in Lamarque’s and 
Walton’s view, they do not make sense or generate categories (genres, norms and values). 
Joseph Margolis rightly sees the point, recognizing not only the role of artistic 
practices and evaluative interpretations in shaping artworks’ meaning and identity, but 
                                                             
9 K. WALTON, Categories of art, in “The Philosophical Review”, 79, 1970, pp. 334-367. 
10 J. MARGOLIS, What, after all, is a work of art?, University Park, Pennylvania State UP 1999. 
11 Cf. P. LAMARQUE, Work and object, New York, Oxford University Press 2010, p. 41. 
12 Ibidem, p. 54. 
13 Ibidem, p. 68. 
14 In this regard Lamarque refers to J. SEARLE, The construction of social reality, London: Allen Lane 1995, p. 
117. 
15 LAMARQUE, Work and Object, p. 75. 
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also artworks’ contribution to the shaping of practices, genres, styles and traditions. One 
the one hand, to individuate an artwork (as different from physical natural or functional 
objects) is to assign it cultural/interpretive/intentional/evaluative “parts” and doing so 
belongs to the same practice of imputing meaning to the artwork by means of 
interpretation. In this regard, Margolis does not diverge from Lamarque’s view. On the 
other hand, however, Margolis rightly defends that «you cannot settle the ontology of art 
by imposing a priori constraints on the logic of interpretation»16. In this regard, Margolis 
interestingly disagrees with Lamarque’s and Walton’s view. Differently from purely 
physical entities, numerical identification of artworks does not necessarily require the 
description of their nature, by means of assigning them determinate and invariant 
properties – i.e. attributing them predicates following bivalent logic. Hence, the identity 
of an artwork does not simply depend from fixed categories and criteria that rule 
interpretation and evaluation. Identity and meaning of artworks can be specified only in 
terms of intentional (i.e. cultural) properties that are in flux, in that they are subject to 
interpretive and evaluative transformations situated in a given cultural context and 
responsive to that particular context as well as to other interpretations. Interpretive 
transformations of this kind are rightly termed improvisations17. They (trans)form artworks’ 
identity and are not constrained by fixed criteria of practices, genres and styles. 
This amounts to saying that artistic categories (genres, styles, and the like) are not 
simply invariant objective properties qualifying the artwork’s identity. Rather, artworks – as 
works of art (in the double sense of the genitive) – impact on artistic categories, since 
they actualize (or realize) and (trans)form artistic categories: an artwork is not a content that 
enters a given artistic category like an object we put in a box. Artworks assign categories 
(typifying styles, genres, and practices) different meanings, thereby transforming them. 
Thus, the relation between artworks and artistic categories (genres, styles, practices etc.) 
is not a one-way relation of determination, but a mutual retroactive interaction.  
(a) Artistic categories develop through artworks, are (trans)formed through 
artworks, emerge out of artworks18.  
                                                             
16 Margolis, What, after all, is a work of art?, p. 95. 
17 Ibidem, p. 96. 
18 Hence, artistic categories should be conceived of in terms of plastic interpretive habits, in the sense I 
will discuss later on in § 3. 
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(b) Each artwork, I repeat, is ex-improviso; while applying the artistic 
category/norm, also emerges out of it and contributes to its (trans)formation. 
Briefly, each successful artwork is an improvisation «open to further 
improvisation»19. 
Hence, although the knowledge of the artistic tradition, genre or practice of a 
given artwork (or artistic event) usually engenders expectations concerning structures, 
values and meanings of artworks, the specific artistic normativity of the individual 
artwork cannot be foreseen in advance. The artwork’s meaning and identity are not 
deduced, as it were, from the tradition, the genre, or the practice the artwork refers to. 
Rules of production as well as standards of evaluation are not completely determined and 
given before the actual existence of the individual artwork. Rather, as the Italian 
philosopher Luigi Pareyson famously wrote, art is that kind of making that invents the 
way of making while making20. Otherwise the artistic enterprise would not be creative. 
Hence, since (successful) art requires creativity, artworks need to exceed bounds and rules 
of given traditions, genres, or practices. Since there are not given recipes for producing 
creative artistic outcomes, artistic creativity, as I have argued elsewhere21, is of an 
improvisational kind. This does not mean that each new successful artistic outcome is 
merely a kind of exception of given rules of traditions, genres, or practices. On the 
contrary, each new successful artwork is a kind of improvisation on an established 
practice, genre or tradition. As such, it contributes to the “life” of the practice, the genre 
or the tradition, precisely by means of emerging out of that practice, genre or tradition. 
In this sense, my argument goes forward, not only each artwork is an improvisation on a 
given tradition, practice, or genre, but the “life” of the tradition, of the practice or of the 
genre is an improvisation on the long run22.  
                                                             
19 Margolis, What, after all, is a work of art?, p. 94. Margolis takes as example Picasso’s “Les demoiselles 
d’Avignon” that «cannot be routinely reconciled with any of the would-be canons of well-formed painting 
up to the intrusion of Les demoiselles» (Ibidem, p. 93). While appropriating African styles and Cezanne’s 
innovations, it is an improvisation on past canons. This a very clear, paradigmatic and blatant example of 
the improvisational and (trans)formative performance of artworks: their sense is not determined by fixed 
categories, but they make sense. The same goes, on my and Bertram’s view, for each artwork deserving 
this name. 
20 Cf. L. PAREYSON, Estetica. Teoria della formatività (1954), Milano, Bompiani 2010, p. 59. 
21 A. BERTINETTO, Performing the Unexpected. Improvisation and Artistic Creativity, in “Daimon”, 57 (2012), pp. 
61-79. 
22 As I have sketched elsewhere, in a paper devoted to musical meaning (Sound pragmatics. An emergentist 
account of musical meaning, in “Rivista italiana di filosofia del linguaggio” 11/2 (2017), pp. 1-2) elaborating 
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In a nutshell: artworks are cultural constructs generated by interpretive meaning 
attributions made by different cultural entities (including persons). Artworks have a 
culturally emergent identity. Consequently, as defended in particularly convincing way by 
Bertram23, art ontology depends on the dynamics of artistic practices (production, 
interpretation, and criticism). This dynamics is improvisational, since it is generated by 
improvisational interactions among different agents at different levels producing 
feedbacks that retroact on artworks’ meaning and identity: although the physical object 
may remain (or be restored as) the same, the emergent intentional (cultural) ‘part’ always 
is in flux. Moreover, artworks participate actively in those improvisational interactions, 
(trans)forming criteria of evaluation/interpretation that emerge out of new artworks. 
Not only that. What I am going to argue in the rest of the paper is that improvisation 
plays a genetic role in the constitution of art as human practice. This is precisely the radical thesis 
suggested by the “Nietzschean” title of my paper, which I will explain in what follows. 
As I am about to explain, improvisation provides the link between human practices and 
art. In other words, improvisation is the way human practices become arts and – also – 
fine arts.  
 
2. Improvisation in the performing arts 
 
In order to clarify my point I will follow Bertram’s example and I will start 
focusing precisely on improvisation in the performing arts.  
                                                             
on Andrew Hamilton’s criticism of Noël Carroll’s intentionalist conversationalism, this view may be 
properly called Conversational improvisational emergentism. Accordingly, interpretation of artworks is like a 
conversation, but differently from Carroll’s virw of the matter (firstly developed in N. CARROLL, Art, 
intentions and conversations, in G. Iseminger (ed.), Intention and interpretation, Philadephia, Temple University 
Press 1992, pp. 97-131), this conversation does not aim at discovering author’s intentions (as A. 
Huddleston rightly defends in his The conversational argument for actual intentionalism, in “British Journal of 
Aesthetics” 52 (2012), pp. 241-256. ). Rather, conversations are improvisational in kind, in that, as Richard 
K. Sawyer argues (cf. R.K. SAWYER, Creating conversations: Improvisation in everyday discourse, Cresskill (NJ), 
Hampton Press 2001), their meaning emerge out of creative improvisational interactions. Hence, 
conversations follow conventions, norms and constraints, but the specific conversational situation reshape 
norms, as speakers’ reciprocal interactions impact pragmatically on the context. Analogously, evaluative 
interpretations of artworks shape creatively their meanings and their flexible identities retroactively: 
Artworks’ meaning and identity emerge and are (trans)formed through improvisational interactions in 
which artworks participate. 
23 Cf. Bertram, Kunst als menschliche Praxis and G. Bertram, Che cos’è l’arte? Abbozzo di un’ontologia dell’arte, in 
A. Bertinetto, G. Bertram (eds.), Il bello dell’esperienza. La nuova estetica tedesca, Milano, Marinotti 2016, pp. 
209-226. 
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It has been often stated that improvisation shows human creativity on the stage. 
This is not always true without qualifications24, but this is (at least partly) true for 
improvisation in the performing arts, such as music, theater, and dance. Although the 
existence of every kind of improvisation requires, at least to some degree, the ontological 
coincidence between invention and realization, improvisation in the performing arts is 
special, because here the results of the creative process are not detachable from the 
process itself: instead, the actual and concrete process of artistic production is (part of) 
the artistic product perceived by the audience. The way of production is intentionally 
exhibited as object of aesthetic attention and appraisal. The point I want to stress at this 
regard is the following. In this kind of improvisation in which the process of artistic 
making is intentionally offered by performers as a component of the focus of aesthetic 
attention and appraisal the work as well as the shaping and the development of artistic habits and 
skills are significantly shown as originating art.  
Consider. Not always an artistic improvisation is particularly unexpected or 
surprising. Rather the big surprise, although always possible, is something rare, if not 
exceptional. The rule is rather the way artists make use of techniques and habits of 
behavior they have learned through the practice as well as the way they adapt their “know 
how”25 to the particular situation of that specific performance, that they cannot know in 
advance in all its details, taking advantage of the conditions and of the actual development 
of the performance, not only for showing their expertise and their more or less virtuous 
artistry, but also for managing their skills in relation to the forms, the materials, and the 
events they have at their disposal “here and now”. The practice of skills and techniques, 
that have become habits of actions, during the performance can produce outcomes that 
can be unexpected (even for the makers) and, if moderately, surprising and new. More 
generally, each event of the performance retroacts on the whole performative process, 
continuously inviting performers and audience to re-negotiate meanings and values of 
the performance. The action and its sense do not depend indeed only upon a previous 
fixed plan or set of intentions and habitualized patterns of actions: on the contrary, the 
sense (which means both the meaning and the direction) of the action builds itself during 
                                                             
24 For a discussion of the issue, cf. A. BERTINETTO, Immagine artistica e improvvisazione, in “Tropos” 7/1 
(2014), pp. 225-255. 
25 Cf. G. RYLE, The Concept of Mind, Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 1949. 
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and with the action, the same way specific performing skills and styles are acquired, as 
habits, during their practice26. 
Improvisation in the performing arts shows precisely the articulation of the 
artistic creative process. This is not a “creatio ex nihilo”, but the transformative practical 
development of inherited and embodied artistic forms and materials that cannot be 
deductively derived from those forms and materials, but “emerges” out of them27. Yet, 
the main point here is that in the same way also performers’ habits and skills shape 
themselves and develop through repeated practice or, more precisely, the development 
of improvisers’ technical and artistic competence is part of the transformative 
development of artistic forms and materials in the course of the creative process. 
The learning of improvisational techniques, abilities and styles is a «learning 
through doing», a «procedural knowledge»28. Surely, this procedural knowledge is 
acquired during rehearsal training. While training and rehearsing, performers shape and 
develop their skills, habits and styles. In each training session and rehearsal skills, habits 
and styles are formed by means of performing the gestures and the movements of which 
those skills, habits and styles consist. Each session retroacts upon already available skills, 
habits, and styles (trans)forming them. Shortly: skills, habits and styles are shaped and 
developed by means of performing them. Competence is generated through 
performance. 
Now, since  
(1) in improvisation in the performing arts creative process and artistic product 
coincide (when the process is finished, the product vanishes too29),  
(2) artistic creativity is the attempt of shaping the ways of making through the 
making itself,  
                                                             
26 Cf. A. BERTINETTO, Eseguire l’inatteso, pp. 68 ff. I will (briefly) discuss the connection within 
improvisation, between habit and creativity infra (§ 3). 
27 Cf. M. FERRARIS, Emergenza, Torino, Einaudi 2016; M. MASCHAT, Performativität und zeitgenössische 
Improvisation, “Auditive Perspektiven”, 2 (2012); A. BERTINETTO, Eseguire l’inatteso, p. 273. 
28 Cf. A. BERKOWITZ, The Improvising Mind, New York, Oxford University Press 2010, pp. 43, 72, 83, 117; 
B. ALTERHAUG, Improvisation as Phenomenon and Tool for Communication, Interactive Action and Learning, in M. 
Santi (ed.), Improvisation. Between Technique and Spontaneity, Newcastle upon Tyne, Cambridge Scholar 
Publishing 2010, pp. 103-133; K.R. SAWYER, Improvisational Creativity as a Model for Effective Learning, in M. 
Santi, Improvisation, pp. 135-151.  
29 Nonetheless results may endure in virtue of recordings, that offer a track manifesting the 
improvisational performance they are the product of. 
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(3) such attempt – that may fail – primarily concerns the ways and the procedures 
of artistic production, that should be re-invented at each application (that is, each artistic 
achievement is partly due to specific ways of production devised for the specific occasion, 
to the extent that each single artistic product re-shapes artistic ways of making), and  
(4) skills, habits and styles make up the procedural knowledge involved in the 
procedures of improvisational artistic production,  
then  
(5) artistic improvisational performances (concerts, shows and the like), in which 
procedural knowledge (skills, habits and styles, shortly: artistic competence) is applied in 
specific situations, are involved in the process of generating and transforming procedural 
knowledge, that is, in the evolution of artistic competence. In other words, each 
performance contributes, to different degrees, to the development of performers’ artistic 
competence, that is, each performance retroacts upon performers’ artistic resources. So 
each performance not only expresses the artist’s personality, but (re)shapes it as well. The 
way performers each time cope (more or less successfully) with the (more or less) 
unexpected situations of the different performances retroactively contributes to the 
evolution of their skills and of their personal artistic styles as well. 
Briefly, in the improvisational performance the artistic work as well as the 
development of artistic competence (in terms of skills, habits and styles) are directly and 
intentionally shown to the audience, since in this case the creative process (including the 
development of artistic techniques) is not closed before exhibiting the artwork.  
This is particularly clear when something unexpected happens which might cause 
the failure of the performance. Work and development of the procedural knowledge that 
nourishes the improvisational practice come often to the fore in these moments. Then, 
the performance shows not only that acquired skills – not only in terms of technical 
expertise, but also and above all of practical wisdom (phronesis) – allow to find, invent, 
and offer a (different, unexpected, or new) sense for unforeseen situations (which are 
potentially risky for the performance outcomes), but also that skills are acquired through 
the practice itself30. 
                                                             
30 See L. GOEHR, Improvising impromptu, or, what to do with a broken string, in G. E. Lewis, Benjamin Piekut 
(eds.), The Oxford handbook of critical improvisation studies, Vol. 1, Oxford-New York, Oxford University Press, 
pp. 458-480. 
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In this sense, improvisation in the performing arts shows at a micro level what 
happens, at a macro level, in artistic practices in general. For every achievement of an 
artist is possible thanks to the artist’s competences, skills, techniques, projects, etc., while, 
at the same time, retroacting on the whole complex of competences, skills, techniques, 
projects, etc. Analogously, each new encounter receivers have with a performance or with 
an artwork retroacts upon their artistic normativity, upon their aesthetic criteria and 
standards for value. This retroactive improvisational way of auto-poietic31 self-development 
is, indeed, the way the normativity of artistic traditions, genres and practices develops. 
But, more generally, this is the way normativity develops in human practices32. This point 
is of invaluable significance for understanding the role of improvisation in showing the 
connection between human practices and art, that is, for understanding the birth of art 
from the spirit of improvisation (and, as we shall see in the conclusion of the paper, for 
understanding also how to make sense of the idea of the end, or of the death, of art in 
the spirit of improvisation). 
 
3. Everyday improvisation and artistic improvisation 
 
In order to explaining this connection and its significance it can be useful to clarify 
the link between everyday improvisation and artistic improvisation. 
Of course, the term improvisation has specific meanings beyond the artistic 
sphere. In the everyday life improvisation is the handling of unforeseen situations where the 
plan and the performance of an action coincide as well as the ability to react adaptively 
to unexpected events, which usually implies the adaptation of a tool for some use 
different than that which it was designed for, or the building of a device from unusual 
components33. The reaction to the emergency forces us, in short, to act without knowing 
exactly what and how to do it. It is a “left-handed” act, as Walter Benjamin defines it in 
Einbahnstrasse (1928): it is something that is done without preparation, that is, without 
                                                             
31 On the notion of autopoiesis see H.R. MATURANA e F. VARELA, Autopoiesis and cognition. The realization 
of the living, Dordrecht, Reidel 1980. Erika Fischer-Lichte applied the concepto of autopoiesis to the theory 
of artistic performance: cf. E. FISCHER-LICHTE, Ästhetik des Performativen, Frankfurt a.M., Suhrkamp 2004. 
32 See G. BERTRAM, Improvisation und Normativität, in G. Brandstetter, H.-F. Bormann, A. Matzke (eds.), 
Improvisieren. Paradoxien des Unvorhersehbaren, Bielefeld, Transcript 2010, pp. 21-40. 
33 Cf. J.E. ANDERSON, Constraint-Directed Improvisation for Everyday Activities, Doctoral Thesis, University of 
Manitoba 1995. 
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knowing how to apply rules for action34. 
But there is another interesting aspect of everyday improvisation to be considered. 
We often practice many everyday activities (walking, reading, writing, swimming, driving 
a car, riding a bicycle, etc.), without paying explicit attention to them: in fact, we have 
learned and assimilated into our bodily movements, through imitation and repeated 
training, techniques to perform such activities without having to think about what and how to do 
while we act. As again Walter Benjamin observes, we cannot learn a second time those 
abilities which have become habits in virtue of our practices of learning through doing 
and which we actualize in an unreflective (automatic, though not mechanical) way35. In 
this sense, while swimming, walking, driving etc., we improvise, since we do not 
knowingly plan what and how to do when we act. Rather, once we learn a skill (which 
means: once a skill become a habit), we act of course knowing how, but without thinking 
at, carrying out the action and what sequence of movements to accomplish, just as the 
artists of improvisation do36. 
In this sense, however, habit is not the opposite of creativity, as it may seem at 
first glance. Habit and invention are not the two antipodes of human behavior, but they 
feed on each other37. This is implied in the illuminating definition of habit provided by 
Felix Ravaisson (1838). According to Ravaisson habit is a  
 
disposition relative to change, which is engendered in a being by the 
                                                             
34 W. BENJAMIN, Einbahnstrasse, Frankfurt a.M., Suhrkamp 1987, p. 16. Cf. G. BRANDSTETTER, 
Improvisation im Tanz. Lecture-performance mit Friedrike Lampert, in M. Gröne et alii (eds.), Improvisation. Kultur- 
und lebens-wissenschaftliche Perspektiven, Freiburg i.B., Berlin, Wien, Rombach 2009, pp. 133-157. 
35 Cf. W. BENJAMIN, Lesekasten, in Berliner Kindheit um Neunzehnhundert, Frankfurt a.M., Suhrkamp 1987. In 
the discussion following on of the talks that originated his paper, Georg Bertram observed that habits are 
not unreflective in the sense of being opposite to human essential power of reflection. I completely agree. 
As dispositions to act in certain ways, they are a constitutive part of the reflective practices of human 
beings. This manifests to us clearly, and somehow sadly, when we indeed loose physical abilities due to 
injuries caused by an accident: in this case we may have to reflexively re-learn how to perform the 
unlearned movement we previously used to perform without explicit and focused reflection. 
36 Hence, many activities carried out in everyday as well as in artistic improvisation are expressions of the 
embodied implicit knowledge, rooted in cultural contexts, that Hubert Dreyfus called “intuitive expertise”. 
See e.g. H. DREYFUS and S. DREYFUS, Mind over machine: the power of human intuition and expertise in the era of 
the computer, New York, The Free Press 1986. I thank André J. Abath for making me aware of the relevance 
of Dreyfus’ work for my investigation. 
37 On the link between routinary habits and creativity and the related issue of everyday aesthetics see P. 
Di Cori, C. Pontecorvo (ed.), Tra ordinario e straordinario: modernità e vita quotidiana, Roma, Carocci 2007 and 
G.L. IANNILLI, Everyday Aesthetics: Institutionalization and “Normative Turn”, in “Proceedings of the European 
Society for Aesthetics”, 8 (2016), pp. 269-287.  
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continuity or the repetition of this very same change. Habit implies more than mere 
mutability; it does not simply imply mutability in something that remains without 
changing; it supposes a change in the disposition, in the potential, in the internal 
virtue of that in which the change occurs, which itself does not change.38  
 
Drawing on this notion of habit, Catherine Malabou defended, in her preface to 
Ravaisson’s essay, that habit is a «resource of possibilities»: it «makes possible a future»39. 
On the one hand, habit is the plastic formation, by means of repetition and practice of 
actions, of individuals’ essential dispositions (as Malabou has recently argued, referring 
to Hegel); so habit is «essence a posteriori»40 of subjectivity, which is generated by 
continuous changes. Yet, on the other hand, «habit is actualized as a habit of changing»41. 
So understood, habit is not the opposite of improvisation. On the contrary, as Gary 
Peters has recently written (elaborating on Malabou’s elaborations on Hegel and 
Ravaisson), habit, as a «doing that has forgotten thought», is a «moment of 
improvisation»: «it is responsible for rather than resistant to the transformation of human 
action and the creativity associated with that»42.  
However, the relevance of improvisation for the everyday practice is not limited 
to adaptive reaction to emergency in real-time and to the shaping of plastic habits of behavior. As a 
matter of fact, generally speaking, not only the performance of any action involves elements of 
improvisation, in that every intention or action plan must cope “here and now” with the 
concrete, unforeseeable, and unique situation of its enactment43; but, independently from 
the “here and now” constraints, the reshuffling or recycling of already-extant material to 
making something new can also be conceived of as improvisation. Hence, improvisation 
                                                             
38 F. RAVAISSON, Of habit, Eng. Trans. by C. Carlisle and M. Sinclair, London, Continuum 2008, p. 25. 
39 C.  MALABOU, “Addiction and Grace: Preface to Felix Ravaisson’s of Habit”, in F. RAVAISSON, Of habit, 
Eng. Trans. by C. Carlisle and M. Sinclair, London, Continuum 2008, vii. 
40 C. MALABOU, The future of Hegel: plasticity, temporality and dialectic, Eng. Trans. by L. During, London, 
Routledge 2005, p.74. 
41 C.  MALABOU, “Addiction and grace: Preface to Felix Ravaisson’s Of habit”, in F. RAVAISSON, Of Habit, 
Eng. Trans. by C. Carlisle and M. Sinclair, London, Continuum 2008, viii. 
42 G. PETERS, Improvising improvisation. From out of philosophy, music, dance, and literature,The University of 
Chicago Press, Chicago and London, 2017, pp. 123, 122, 127.  For the rich, but sometimes a bit chaotic, 
discussion of the relation between improvisation, repetition and habit see pp. 89-168. 
43 Cf. S. L. FOSTER (quoted in G. PETERS, The philosophy of improvisation, Chicago and London, The 
University of Chicago Press 2009, p. 115): «The performance of any action, regardless of how 
predetermined it is in the minds of those who perform it and those who witness it, contains an element 
of improvisation». 
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is not only the act of doing something “on the spot”, without preparation and/or without 
the following of planned instructions, but is also the adaptive and appropriative re-use of 
something in a more or less useful, valuable, and creative way. 
Within the artistic field, improvisation (and now I mean: conscious and 
intentional improvisation) is – as we have already seen – the development of creativity in real-
time (following Lydia Goehr, this may be called «improvisation ex tempore») or, even in not 
explicitly improvised arts, (the ability) to (successfully) react to sudden problems (Lydia Goehr 
called this kind of improvisation «improvisation impromptu»)44, but also, and even 
independently from the real-time constraints, the creative rearrangement not only of 
materials, included ‘poor’ stuff like wastes, but also of forms, styles, conventions, 
techniques, and habits.  
In this sense practices like variations, arrangements, covers, mash-ups, citations, 
remixes etc. are all forms of improvisations45. They all are forms of «distributed 
creativity»: they are ways in which an old (material or cultural) stuff is appropriated, re-signified 
and transformed, in unforeseen ways46. The way Broadway songs became jazz standards is 
paradigmatic of these processes, that concretely manifest how the way of making is 
invented in the making, i.e. how creativity is at work in the arts. Creative novelty ensues 
from appropriation and re-adjustment of more or less passively inherited cultural stuffs: 
in other words, the invention of the new ensues from the appropriation of the old. This 
is clear in the way artists create by reflexively reacting to past artworks, in different ways: 
by adaptation, distortion, re-combination, de-structuration, citation, and even rejection. 
 
4. The improvisational nature of cultural practices  
 
Now, my thesis is that an improvisational process of this kind, an improvisational 
performance on the long run, is responsible not only for the ongoing development of 
                                                             
44 See GOEHR, Improvising Impromptu. 
45 Cf. G. BROWN, D. Hesmondhalgh, Western Music and Its Others. Difference, Representation and Appropriation 
in Music, Berkeley, University of California Press, 2000; F. DÖHL, Mashup in der Musik. Fremdreferenzielles 
Komponieren, Sound Sampling und Urheberrecht, Bielefeld, Transcript 2016; Ladri di musica, issue of “Estetica. 
Studi e ricerche” 1 (2014) ed. by A. Bertinetto, E. Gamba e D. Sisto; L. LESSIG, Remix. Making Art and 
Commerce Thrive in the Hybrid Economy, London, Bloombsury 2008; J. O. YOUNG, C.G. BRUNK, The Ethics 
of Cultural Appropriation, Malden MA, Wiley-Blackwell 2009. 
46 On “distributed creativity” see G. BORN, On Musical Mediation: Ontology, Technology, and Creativity, in 
“Twentieth-Century Music, 2/1 (2005), pp. 7-36. 
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artistic traditions, genres, and practices, but also for the evolution of everyday human 
practices as and into art practices. One of the main theses of Michel De Certeau’s book 
L’invention du quotidien is precisely this47. Fine arts are, as it were, specializations of arts 
conceived of in terms of practices, that is: arts of doing. Human practices, as arts of doing 
of different kinds, work exactly by appropriating and adapting institutionalized norms, 
habits and conventions to particular situations in unprecedented ways, inventing, through 
the application of rules or the exercise of habits, spaces of freedom («tactics», as De 
Certeau calls them), that (trans)form the rules and the habits (i.e. the «strategies»), 
creatively producing novelties. 
According to De Certeau, society organizes itself through institutions of different 
kinds that rule human behavior. Institutionalized, structured, codified and normalized 
procedures regulate the spheres of practical life in methodic ways. However, instead of 
automatically and rather passively executing the rules that constitute the institutions (the 
strategies), human beings discover, in different situations, rooms of freedom and 
invention. In virtue of those rooms of freedom human beings use and abuse in tactic 
ways the institutions to which they are and should be submitted for aims they freely pose 
to themselves. In other words, resorting to that kind of intelligence one learns only by 
means of exercising it, which is the practical intelligence called metis in ancient Greek, 
human beings apply rules and conventions in ways that inventively transform those rules 
and conventions, adapting them to specific situations and taking advantage of their 
contingence for finding concrete solutions to concrete problems 48. This inventive 
behavior is the fuel, as it were, of human practices. Without it, there would be no human 
                                                             
47 M. DE CERTEAU, L’invention du quotidien. I. Arts de faire, Paris, Gallimard 1990. 
48 See M. DETIENNE, J.P. VERNANT, Les ruses de l'intelligence. La mètis des Grecs (1974), Paris, Flammarion 
1993. Metis is that kind of intelligence typified by Ulysses. Adorno and Horkheimer famously condemn 
Ulysses as paradigm of the instrumental reason of Enlightenment (cf. M. HORKHEIMER – Th. W. 
ADORNO, Dialektik der Aufklärung (1944), Frankfurt am Main, S. Fischer, 1969, Nachdruck als 
Taschenbuch 1988) However, Adorno is also a tireless critic of improvisation. Although the constructive 
formal process of improvisation coincides with the retroactive temporal dynamics that he himself praised 
in his essay on the “musique informelle” (“But in music nothing has the right to follow something else 
unless it has been determined by what precedes it or conversely, unless it reveals ex post facto that what has 
preceded it was, in reality, its own precondition”. Th. W. ADORNO, Vers und musique informelle, in Id., Quasi 
una fantasia, London, Lawrence & Wishart 1988, pp. 272-305, here p. 297), Adorno never understood the 
creative, imaginative and transformative potential of improvisation that he reduced to mere repetition and 
passive imitation. Hence, the reduction of the Ulysses’ practical and “kairologic” intelligence (which 
operates at the opportune moment or rather that makes opportune the moment in which it operates) to 
an instrument of power and dominance is a mistake deriving from a fundamental blindness toward 
improvisational creativity. I thank Giorgia Cecchinato for pushing me on this point. 
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agency, as we understand it.  
This crucial point is confirmed also by contemporary anthropology. As Tim 
Ingold and Elizabeth Hallam state in the introduction of the collective book Creativity and 
cultural improvisation, the social and cultural life of people is improvisational:  «people have 
to work it out as they go along»49. They «construct culture as they go along and as they 
respond to life’s contingencies»50.  
 
In this process they are compelled to improvise, not because they are 
operating on the inside of an established body of conventions, but because no system 
of codes, rules and norm can anticipate every possible circumstance. At best it can 
provide general guidelines or rules of thumb whose very power lies in their 
vagueness or non-specificity. The gap between these non-specific guidelines and the 
specific conditions of a world that is never the same from one moment to the next 
not only opens up a space for improvisation, but also demands it, if people are to 
respond to these conditions with judgement and precision. “Improvisation” […] “is 
a cultural imperative”51. 
 
Hence, they conclude, «[i]mprovisation and creativity […] are intrinsic to the very 
process of social and cultural life»52. 
 
Interestingly enough, this inventive behavior, that typifies human agency and that 
uses the rules it is submitted to, adapting them to aims of different kinds that are not 
foreseen by the rule, is what an important cultural tradition calls “art”. The notion of 
“art” means here that kind of knowledge that does not consist in knowing that, but in 
knowing how, or, rather, in the excellence of a knowing how. This excellent knowing how does 
not depend upon the routinary application of rules or models. As Freud would have had 
it, it is «eine Sache des Takts» 53 (a matter of feeling). Moreover, according to the venerable 
                                                             
49 E. HALLAM, T. INGOLD (eds.), Creativity and Cultural Improvisation, Oxford-new York, Berg 2007, p. 1. 
50 E. BRUNER, Ivi, p. 2. 
51 Ivi, p. 19.  
52 Ivi, p. 19.  
53 S. FREUD, Eine Teufelneurose in siebzehnten Jahrhundert (1922), in S. FREUD, Gesammelte Werke XIII, pp. 315-
354, here p. 330. 
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cultural tradition that goes from Francis Bacon through Denis Diderot54 up to Emile 
Durkheim55 and beyond, art, in this sense, is that kind of knowledge that is not merely 
contemplative. Art is rather a practical knowing how to do that implies the production of 
objects of different kinds, thereby exceeding the non-operative scientific knowledge of 
methodic rules. The same way utterances, each speech acts we use in our conversation 
may exceed the codes of grammars and dictionaries, by and while using them, for saying 
what is appropriate in a given and specific situation, and this may result, on the long run, 
in the transformation of a language, art is a practical knowledge that, through its concrete 
achievements, transform rules and models of cognition and practice. 
This does not mean, however, that this knowing how to do which is art is not ruled; 
it is certainly ruled, but the rules are generated, and transformed, through the praxis. In 
this sense, as also De Certeau observes, knowing how to do (and how to deal with diverse 
materials and forms in concrete situations) is self-ruled in the very same way the Kantian 
reflexive judgment is at work in the realm of aesthetic experience. In the following of the 
paper I will suggest that the step from this idea of art as tactical practice of knowing how to 
do responding to concrete situations to Luigi Pareyson’s view of art as formative making 
that invents its own rules in the making is not very long, as it may seem. 
 
5. Art as “knowing how to do”: the inventive use of norms 
 
Art as knowing how to do is the inventive use of normative rules. In other words, it 
is an improvisation upon normative rules, which exploits the rules – as well as standards 
and habits of behavior – and transforms the rule according to the rule. This strange and 
apparently self-contradictory manner of speaking (“a transformation of the rule in 
concert with the rule” is an odd thing indeed!) can be explained and justified by means 
of going beyond De Certeau’s conceptualization. Indeed, one may of course understand 
De Certeau’s own aim in making the distinction between strategic behavior following 
institutions and inventive tactic behavior transforming institutions – a distinction that, by 
                                                             
54 See J.-L. MARTINE, L’article ART de Diderot: machine et pensée pratique, in “Recherches sur Diderot et sur 
l’Encyclopédie”, 39 (2005), pp. 41-79. 
55 See R. O’TOOLE, Durkheim and the problem of art: some observations, in “Durkheimian Studies / Études 
Durkheimiennes”, New Series, 8 (2002), pp. 51-69. 
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the way, looks very similar to Noam Chomsky’s dichotomy between rules-following and 
rules-changing creativity56. This distinction is apt to clarify the specificity of human 
everyday practices that presupposes institutionalized rules and intervene upon the rules 
in an inventive way. However, this model is too static. It does not explain the way 
normative institutions are generated and develop within human practices, that is, it does 
not explain how is it possible that norms are generated in the practice of following norms. 
A genetic and dynamic model, instead, may do exactly this job, since it may 
explain that the inventive use and abuse of institutions, whose excellence may be 
conceived of as “art”, is precisely the way institutions and their rules form and transform 
themselves. At this regard, it can be appropriate to refer to Wittgenstein’s famous saying 
«We make up the rule as we go along»57. The rules of human practices and behaviors are 
not transformed just by their violation, but rather by their applications. Rules develop in 
virtue of uses and abuses that inventively improvise upon them according to the specific 
circumstances that are unforeseeable by the rules. Transformations of rules ensue from 
the adaptation of rules to those specific situations of their application. So uses of the rule 
(potentially) transform the rule, and the behavior normed and controlled by the rule, by 
applying the rule in a particular situation and in a specific way. 
A good example of this process may be the following. The pragmatic application 
of grammar rules in the very use of a language inventively (trans)forms the rule. In De 
Saussure’s terms58, the langue lives through the parole, but is also changed by the parole, 
whose use it is not deducible by the langue. So the organizational autonomy of a creative 
gesture that becomes a new practice is not detached from or incompatible with its validity 
and value: while autonomously changing the old practice, it re-signifies the practice, 
making it (if differently) valid and valuable. 
 
6. The genetic link between art and practices 
 
However, we still have to go some further steps ahead in order to explain in which 
                                                             
56 Cf. A. BERTINETTO, Performing the Unexpected, p. 120; N. CHOMSKY, Current issues in linguistic theory, The 
Hague, Mouton 1964; E. GARRONI, Creatività, Macerata, Quodlibet 2010.  
57 L. WITTGENSTEIN, Philosophical investigations, Oxford, Blackwell, 1953. 
58 F. DE SAUSSURE, Cours de linguistique générale, Paris, Payot 1916. 
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sense the notion of improvisation, together with its value and specificity, is useful for 
understanding the genetic connection between human practices and art not only in the sense of 
knowing how to do, but also in the modern aesthetic meaning of the word “art”. For space 
reason, I will sum up those steps in a very sketchy way. 
(a) Art as evaluative concept. The term “art” historically got an evaluative sense. Art, as 
knowing how to do, is not only a practical improvisation upon human institutionalized and 
traditional practices. It is also an improvisation upon human practices: as such it may 
succeed or fail. We understand this term precisely in this evaluative sense in locutions 
beginning with the expression “the art of” in order to stress the merit, i.e. the successful 
achievements of activities involving an improvisational knowing how to do in multifarious 
practical fields. Examples are legions: «The art of having fun», «The art of design», «The 
art of the brick» (this is the title of an exhibition of Lego), «The art of leadership», «The 
art of being right»59, «El arte de volar»60, and even the «art of the farewell» (as written in 
a funeral home advertisement in Turin, Italy: «L’arte dell’ultimo saluto»). A separate 
discourse would merit, of course, the very idea of an art of living, an idea that, while 
remaining within the circumscribed context of Western thought, has a noble cultural 
tradition that goes from Socrates, Montaigne, and Nietzsche up to Foucault, Alexander 
Nehamas and Zygmunt Bauman61, and that is related to the idea of human life as an auto-
poietic process, i.e. as a creative improvisation that shapes its identity in the course of 
performance. 
(b) Art as aesthetic notion. However, this evaluative sense in virtue of which human 
practices and art are connected, is still not sufficient for understanding the aesthetic notion 
of art, that is the notion of “fine arts”. My thesis is that the generation of the notion of 
“fine arts” required not only the excellence of practice of use or abuse beyond the rules 
in the application of rules, but also a kind of re-institutionalization. A trivial example, that 
I nonetheless hope may be effective, is this: when we ski or bike with art or have tea with 
art or whatever, perhaps thereby inventing new techniques or styles to carry out these 
                                                             
59 A. SCHOPENHAUER, Eristische Dialektik oder Die Kunst, Recht zu behalten (1830?), Frankfurt am Main, 
Haffmans Verlag 2007. 
60 A. ALTARRIBA, El arte de volar, Alicante, Ediciones de Ponent 2009 (it won the spanish Premio 
Nacional de Cómic 2010). 
61 A. NEHAMAS, The Art of Living, 2000; Z. BAUMAN, The Art of Life, Cambridge, UK-Malden, MA, Polity 
Press, 2008.  
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practices, we do not yet produce works of art. The notion of “fine arts” requires, in other 
words, the improvisation upon the rules to become, in turn, a special institution, with its 
own codified social habits, rules, and articulations62. This institutionalization, in turn, 
concealed the link between everyday human practices and art, giving rise to the 
widespread idea that art is an independent realm, a sphere severed from reality and life: 
this originated the so called autonomist paradigm of art, strongly and efficaciously criticized 
by Georg Bertram in the previously mentioned book. However, the link between 
everyday human practices and art remained active in the underground, as it were. 
A possible (and easy) example for explaining this process is poetry. Poetry is the 
creative use of language. As I have previously suggested, each pragmatic utterance (De 
Saussure’s parole) is the improvisational use of the langue that may transform the langue by 
means of reshuffling linguistic forms and materials in more or less creative way. 
Paradigmatic is here the metaphor. The metaphor may be conceived of as an adaptive and 
transformative abuse that may have creative outcomes. Poetry is the excellent, intentional 
and social ruled use of this abuse, which finds new possibility of using, experiencing and 
developing languages, i.e. that possibly invents new linguistic uses and habits, that may 
be later institutionalized. Value and specificity of this praxis are the two sides of the same 
medal. 
(c) Art as self-reflective and critical practice. However, art is not only the excellent social 
use of the improvisational (ab)use of rules. It is also a reflective improvisational 
performance on art as institution. Art implies a self-reflection, in that it is (also) a 
reflection on past as well as on other art. As argued by Georg Bertram in different 
occasions63 and as Alva Noë recently wrote, art is always, «an engagement with other art, 
with artists, and audiences, and teachers and students. Art is, really, itself, a critical 
practice»64. Art grows through a critical confrontation with other art: it is a practical 
reflection on art through a confrontation with artworks of the past and other artworks 
of the present. In other words, it is a reflection on already institutionalized art, i.e. on the 
institution of art. This reflection upon the art institution(s) – which is a practical reflection 
                                                             
62 On the birth of art as institution cf. L. SHINER, The Invention of Art: A Cultural History, Chicago, 
University of Chicago Press 2001. 
63 Cf. especially BERTRAM, Kunst als menschliche Praxis. 
64 Cf. A. NOË, Strange tools, p. 109. 
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performed by art and, at the same time, a reflection that shapes art as art (as “fine art”, 
even when this, to say it with Hans-Robert Jauss’s famous expression, is “not fine art 
anymore”65) – is exhibited in contemporary art at least since Duchamp’s readymade, whose 
gesture is precisely an exhibited reflexive and performative playing upon and with art as 
institution. In other words, it is an exhibited improvisation upon the social codification 
of an excellent improvisational use and abuse, i.e. of a knowing how to do. The art institution 
was creatively used (and abused) as an ingredient of a (already past) new art which 
exhibited itself as an improvisational collage, using, abusing and transfiguring 
commonplace non-artistic materials66. 
(d) Art as ongoing interaction between institution and transformation. But the game (nicely 
explained by Arthur Danto67) is not over: for the performative gesture of the Avant-garde 
(the gesture of the revolt, sometimes playful, jokey or ironic, sometimes serious and even 
violent, against art as institution) will be re-institutionalized68, and then – against and 
upon this further codification – artist will improvise again, for example re-affirming the 
practical and performative power of art as imagination and/or as knowledge by means 
of promoting the idea of artistic research69 or inventing new expressive forms by means of 
de-structuring and re-mixing artistic genres and media70. 
(e) Improvisation as paradigmatic art. Artistic improvisation, I finally contend, coming 
back to what I argued at the beginning of my paper, exemplifies, in the space and in the 
time of the performance this performative and transformative process, that is, the way in 
which in human practices and in art as well – precisely as human practice – codified 
forms, materials, and procedures (including the codified forms, materials, and procedures 
constituting art as social institution) are inventively used and abused and these uses are 
                                                             
65 Cf. H.R. JAUSS (ed.), Die nicht mehr schöne Künste, München, Fink 1968. 
66In this sense, Duchamp’s readymade is a performing gesture that displays improvisation as/at the root of 
art. I thank Walter Menon for inviting me to clarity this point. On the relation between improvisation and 
readymade cf. my article: La paradoja de los indiscernibles y la improvisación artística, in S. Castro, F. Perez Carreño: 
Arthur Danto and the philosophy of art, Murcia, editum, pp. 183- 201.  
67 A.C. DANTO, The transfiguration of the commonplace, Cambridge Mass, London, Harvard University Press 
1981. 
68 See Peter BÜRGER, Theorie der Avantgarde, Frankfurt am Main, Suhrkamp 1974. 
69 Cf. G. VILAR, Aesthetic precariousness, in “Cosmo”, 6 (2015), Art and aesthetic experience, ed. by A. Bertinetto, 
pp. 27-38.  
70 Cf. T.W. ADORNO, Die Kunst und die Künste, in T.W. ADORNO, Gesammelte Schriften, Band 10/1, Frankfurt 
am Main., Suhrkamp 1977, pp. 432-454; T.W. ADORNO, Über einige Relationen zwischen Musik und Malerei, in 
T.W. ADORNO, Gesammelte Schriften, Band 16, Frankfurt am Main 1978, pp. 628-642. 
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in turn normalized and then re-used as ingredients of new improvisations. Improvisation, I 
now contend, is the genetic core of art and paradigmatic for art as human practice. 
 
7. The role of improvisation connecting art and practices 
 
The theoretical point I want to stress is not uneasy to express. The practice of 
improvisation exemplifies the very exercise of artistic creativity, the encounter of the 
artist with the surprise of the forms and materials s/he works with71, as well as the 
connection with the ingenious and experimental ability to reformulate problems, projects 
and criteria in unprecedented ways, reinventing them during the practice, in order to offer 
effective solutions in terms of the costs and benefits balance as well as in terms of the 
risks and outcomes balance72. In improvisation, the conditions of creativity come to the 
foreground: it is the background73 of practices, traditions, skills, techniques and habits 
which nourishes the artwork and with respect to which the artwork (like the metaphor 
and the joke74) emerges unexpectedly. 
This theoretical framework provides the right explanation for understanding both 
(a) the link between human practices and art as well as (b) the role played by 
improvisation.  
As to (a) this model nicely supports a conciliation of opposite theoretical models 
of art: the different theories of art provided by Kant – who stressed the specificity of the 
aesthetic experience of nature and of art – and by Dewey – who stressed the value of art 
as contribution to a satisfying human experience. Moreover this model offers a genetic 
account of art, that could nicely integrate both the Hegelian view concerning the 
historical-rational development of the art practices as well as more recent approaches 
developed in the human sciences (and, in particular, anthropology, sociology, and 
psychology) that are interested in showing the rooting of art in human perceptual powers, 
cultural habits and social environments. 
                                                             
71 E. HUOVINEN, On attributing artistic creativity, in A. Bertinetto, A. Martinengo (eds.), Re-thinking creativity. 
Creativity between art and philosophy, special issue of “Tropos”, 4/2 (2011), pp. 65-86.  
72 Cf. C. DOWLING, The value of ingenuity, in A. Bertinetto, A. Martinengo (eds.), Re-thinking Creativity, pp. 
47-64.  
73 Cf. A. BERTINETTO, Eseguire l’inatteso, Chap. 2, § 6. 
74 See NOË, Strange tools, p. 108. 
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As to (b), the value of improvisation relies in its fundamental contribution to 
human practices, to their genetic link with art as knowing hot to do as well as to the 
evaluative aesthetic constitution of art as a kind of making that invents its norms in the 
making, as Luigi Pareyson famously argued. Its specificity consists in the way it shows 
the auto-poietic development of normativity in real-time through the interplay between 
co-performers and between performers and audience as well as through the adaptive and 
exaptive interaction between the artists and the artistic forms and material they use as 
well as between the artists and the social and cultural situation of the performance. 
Obviously, at the conclusion of my paper, some further clarifications are in order 
for avoiding possible objections. The most important one concerns the role of 
improvisation (and of art) within the conceptual relation that links together tradition and 
innovation. This relation is often conceived of in terms of an opposition and 
improvisation is identified sometimes with tradition, continuity and repetition and 
sometimes, instead, with novelty, invention75 and interruption. However, improvisation 
(as paradigmatic of art in general) is not to be understood either as repetition of 
tradition(s) and imitation or as absolute innovation and invention76. Rather, in 
improvisation repetition and invention are dialectically intertwined. Thus looking at 
improvisation helps to understand tradition in terms of continuous (trans)formation and 
invention as specific use/abuse of inherited habits, rules, styles, and techniques. 
Hence, Vladimir Jankélévitch was right in saying that improvisation is always a 
«beginning» (of a potentially different normativity, and of a potential different 
temporality)77. In this way he attributed to improvisation the specific feature that 
according to Hannah Arendt characterizes human action78. Arendt maintains that proper 
                                                             
75 Cf. A. ZANETTI, Improvisation und Invention, Zürich-Berlin, Diaphanes 2014. 
76 The criticism to the idea of improvisation as innovation is the core of the already mentioned book by 
G. PETERS, The philosophy of improvisation. This criticism is deepened in G. PETERS, Improvising Improvisation. 
77 Cf. V. JANKÉLÉVITCH, De l’improvisation, in La rhapsodie. Verve et improvisation musicale, Paris, Flammarion 
1955. Without mentioning Jankélévitch, but drawing rather on Heidegger, Peters (Improvising improvisation, 
pp. 7-27) elaborates on the crucial relevance of the difference between (what he seems to understand as a 
mere factual) start and the significant very beginning of improvisation, which is actually to be understood as 
«enactment and dramatization of the beginning»  (p. 12), that, on its part, is condition of possibility of 
every start. I follow Peters in his making this distinction; still the way he establishes this distinction is 
somehow obscure to me. 
78 Cf. H. ARENDT, The Human Condition, University Press, Chicago, 1958; H. ARENDT, Understanding and 
politics, in “Partisan Review”, 20/4 (1953), pp. 377-392. For an “Arendtian” approach to (musical) 
improvisation, cf. P.A. KANELLOPOULOS, Musical improvisation as action: An Arendtian perspective, in “Action, 
Criticism, and Theory for Music Education”, 6/3 (2007), pp, 107-110. 
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human action is birth, initiative, new beginning, generation of the unexpected79. It involves the 
creation of the new; in this sense, action is also free as it is free from intentions and 
projects that, typical of technological and industrial production, impede the real exercise 
of creativity (which Arendt conceptualizes on the basis of the romantic idea of the genius). 
I am not sure that Arendt is completely right in denying creativity to industrial and 
technological processes and, at this regard, her conception seems to be indebted to the 
general criticism directed by some significant twentieth-century philosophers (primarily 
Heidegger) to the technique. Actually, also technology and industrial production are 
human practices characterized by the improvisational dialectic between institution and 
transformation. However, I take her view as generally meaning that human action is not 
mechanical, that is, it does not follow routinary plans of execution, but, still relying on 
habits, it is reflective and formative in Pareyson’s sense: it invents its way of doing, 
thereby producing the new. If we accept Arendt’s thesis, improvisation is, therefore, the 
paradigmatic model of human action as well as the exemplary paradigm of the creative 
artwork: both surprise the foreseeable outcomes of fixed plans. Hence, improvisation is 
always a beginning, since in improvisation rules are suspended in every particular situation 
by their own applications. 
Improvisation invents the rule while following it, while applying, it while iterating 
it. The normativity that rules an improvisation may change during the improvisation. 
Every event occurring during an improvisational performance may result in the 
(trans)formation of the normative constraints and the evaluative criteria of the 
improvisation, i.e. in a new beginning, just as any artwork – precisely as a work of art (in 
the double sense of the genitive) – can bring about the transformation of the criteria 
(depending on a certain style or genre) for evaluating art, at the same time they actualize 
or apply such criteria80.  
The same way criteria for aesthetic judgment change precisely in virtue of the 
works that are judged aesthetically, what happens in an improvisation can redefine the 
criteria for its success, without necessarily causing it to fail (though, as I will soon suggest, 
the risk of failure is constitutive of art). 
                                                             
79 According to Arendt human being as such is to be conceived of in terms of beginning. Cf. H. 
ARENDT, Between Past and Future: Six Exercises in Political Thought, New York, The Viking Press 1961. 
80 See above § 1. 
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This is not to say, however, that improvisation is a “creatio ex nihilo”. Rather, 
improvisation requires, instead of avoiding or denying, a basis of patterns, habits, skills, 
rules, standards. It requires a background that, as it happens in every human and artistic 
practices, is received and appropriated, reshuffled, abused through its repetitions: 
through repetitions of patterns, habits, rules, standards, styles. Not repetitions of the 
same, but repetitions of the different: repetitions of a background that, as it comes to the 
foreground while being applied, is appropriated and adapted, i.e. continuously 
(trans)formed. As a matter of fact, the iteration must cope with the specific situation of 
it application that retroactively implies the transformation of the background (and this is 
the way how habits are shaped in human practices: cf. supra §§ 2-3). Hence, Derrida is 
certainly right in saying that improvisation, as absolute unforeseen novelty, is 
impossible81. Like freedom, improvisation exists only when it is conquered, it exists only 
as practiced. So the actual possibility of choice of actions is always constrained and 
limited. 
In this sense, absolute improvisation is a kind of Grenzbegriff (“boundary notion”, 
“limiting concept”) that regulates how we think about certain artistic practices. However, 
empirically, absolute improvisation is impossible: in order to act, improvisers and artists 
need habits, intentions, rules, techniques, traditions of practices and material resources 
as fuel for their creations. So, the absolute unforeseen, like the absolute original, is 
impossible. However, the factual conditions of possibility of improvisation are put in 
play in an improvisation, the same way the conditions of artistic creativity are renegotiated 
(that is: appropriated, re-used, and abused) in every singular artwork: as paradigmatically 
exemplified by improvisation, the conditions of possibility of art are not only 
transformed, but further developed in every new artistic achievement. Hence, the 
innovative creativity of improvisation, and of art, is required for building the tradition of 
rules, habits, techniques etc. that builds up the basis of improvisation (and of art). Better: 
the innovative creativity of improvisation is this tradition as an ongoing and 
transformative process. The basis of improvisation (and of art) is part of that creative 
process that, in order to evolve and succeed as such, must re-establish its own 
                                                             
81 Cf. J. DERRIDA, Unpublished interview, http://www.derridathemovie.com/readings.html, 1982. Cf. S. 
RAMSHAW, Deconstructin(g) jazz improvisation: Derrida and the law of the singular event, in “Critical Studies on 
Improvisation”, 2/1 (2006). 
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presuppositions82. 
Not only that: the process of each improvised performance and the creation of a 
new artwork reproduces the recursive and retroactive articulation of normativity that 
constitutes the dynamic retroactive connection between the tradition of a practice and 
the exercise (the ab/use) of the practice, and that for sure is to be explained in terms of 
ongoing improvisation. Interestingly, improvisation, as recursive dialectic between 
application and (trans)formation of norms and habits of behavior is precisely the way 
normativity is at work in human practices83. 
To sum up: improvisation is impossible if conceived of in terms of an 
autonomous act ex nihilo, as absolutely unconditional freedom. However, we do not need 
at all to conceive of improvisation in this naive way. If conceived of in terms of (more or 
less successful) transformational and adaptive use of practices in specific situations, by 
means of a tactical and kairologic metis – that (ab)use a normative frame and makes 
opportune the moment in which it operates –, improvisation is not merely possible: it is 
rather the actual way human practices work and develop. As I have suggested, art, as 
human practice, is a specific dimension of that way human practices work and develop.  
 
8. Conclusion: end(s) and birth of art 
 
In this article I have tried to argue in favor of a genetic link between human 
practices and art mediated by improvisation. Human practices develop in a tactical-
transformational-improvisational way; art – both as knowing how to do and as aesthetic fine 
art – is the (intentional or unintentional) use of improvisational creativity, according to 
which habits, skills, styles, genres, standards and norms are formed, performed and 
transformed in concrete situations; improvisation in the performing art is the both 
habitual-adaptive and spontaneous-creative exercise of kairologic metis in real-time which 
paradigmatically shows here and know the genetic connection between human practices 
                                                             
82 Therefore, the improvisational process is articulated through the Hegelian logic of the position of the 
pre-supposition. Cf.  L. ILLETTERATI, Il sistema come forma della libertà nella filosofia di Hegel (razionalità e 
improvvisazione), in “Itinera”, 10 (2015), pp. 41-63. 
83 I discussed the issue elsewhere, also I relation to philosophical insights of Jacques Derrida, Carl Schmidt, 
Ludwig Wittgenstein and Hans-Georg Gadamer: cf. Eseguire l’inatteso, Chap. 7; Formatività ricorsiva; “Do not 
fear mistakes”. 
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and artistic creativity. Being improvisational, both human practices (in other words: 
culture) and art (as human practice) are as such experimental in character: they are kinds 
of improvisation on other practices and on precedent artistic outcomes. 
In order to conclude the paper, I will briefly explain how two mayor topics of 
contemporary research in philosophy of art and of history of aesthetics may play an 
interesting role in the picture I have outlined so far. I am referring to the ideas of the end 
and of the ends of art. 
As to the ends of art (in the plural), by showing the genetic link between art and 
human practices and by defending that both are improvisational, I already suggested that 
art is per se not independent from other practices as well as from uses and functions as 
claimed by philosophers sticking with a formalist paradigm of artistic autonomy: art may 
have, and often has, ends, contents, and meanings of different kinds, while at the same 
time maintaining its own specificity. Not only, and merely, art is often used and abused 
for different aims (paintings with religious subjects may be used for educating people; a 
TV Series on the history of a Reigning House may be used for promoting regional 
tourism; Music may be used for affording emotional responses, etc. Please choose your 
own example). Rather, art as such is a reflective practice that impacts on human practices, 
even though artworks, precisely as strange tools, have not instrumental function84. 
But following the spurs of the genetic link between art and improvisation traced 
so far, how can I deal with the notion (and the challenge) of the end of art (in the singular)? 
Moreover, what does the theme of the end, or the death, of art (as the question is generally 
known in Italy) to do with the specific topic of this article? I am not concerned here with 
discussing the different ways philosophers have understood this notion. I am interested 
neither in explaining how we can make sense of Hegel’s thesis that in modernity art 
cannot accomplish anymore the function of orienting and sustaining human culture, nor 
in discussing Danto’s interpretation of the notion as claiming the end of art history85.  
I will rather tackle this issue from the perspective of the aesthetics of success (German: 
“Gelingen”/“Gelungenheit”; Italian: “riuscita”) worked out by the already mentioned Italian 
                                                             
84 This is the main point independently articulated by Bertram and Noë. 
85 I have discussed Danto’s idea of the end of art history in relation to Gombrich’s view of artistic progress 
in A. BERTINETTO, Gombrich, Danto, and the question of artistic progress, in “Proceedings of the European 
Societies for Aesthetics”, 7 (2015), pp. 37-50. 
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philosopher Luigi Pareyson which is nowadays embraced by philosophers of art such as 
Georg Bertram and Alva Noë. As I have already suggested, art is a tentative endeavor 
and may succeed or fail accordingly to standards that are themselves formed, performed 
and transformed through the artistic practice as human beings, and human culture, go 
along. Artistic practices develop through interactions between artists, receivers, and 
critics that involve continuous (trans-)formative (re-)negotiations not only of methods, 
forms, materials, topics, values and functions of art, but also of the essence of art. Each 
artwork is (or, if you prefer, embodies) a reflective question on what art is, because each 
artwork restates and reshapes the normative standards of art. The answer to that question 
as well as the success of that transforming restatement is never granted. In this sense, art 
– generally understood – is an experimentation that may succeed and fail and this 
uncertainty, that is, the constant possibility of failure is a constitutive, a definitional 
feature of art as human practice. This is another way to show, in one shot, both the 
autonomy (the specificity) and the heteronomy (the value) of art, i.e. the possible intrinsic 
agreement, their apparent oppositions notwithstanding, between Kant’s, Dewey’s, and 
Hegel’s views of art86. 
The end of art – as interpreted by Bertram as the constant possibility of failure – 
is intrinsic both to fine arts and to art as knowing how to do, and this amounts to saying that 
it is intrinsic both to art and to other human practices. However, as I have shown 
elsewhere87, the failure, which also means the violation of, or the deviation from, 
normative constraints, is not negative per se. Failures (in reference to established standards 
of success) may have surprisingly creative outcomes. Again, being uncertainty and the 
constant possibility of failure as well as their possible creative quality intrinsic features of 
improvisation – even when it goes on as habitual repetition of routine patterns of 
behavior –, this insistence on the constitutive uncertainty of art, human practices, and 
improvisation offers another important way for showing both the specificity and the 
paradigmatic value of improvisation for human practices and for art as well. And, of 
course, this is another contribution for throwing light on the genetic link between human 
practices and art provided by improvisation. In a sense, the end, or the death, of art, 
                                                             
86 Following Bertram and Noë one may add also Heidegger to this company. 
87 A. BERTINETTO, “Do not fear mistakes”. 
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conceived of in terms of art’s constitutive uncertainty and precarity88, that is, of art’s 
unavoidable risk of failure, throws light on its very beginning: on the birth of art from the 
spirit of improvisation. 
                                                             
88 The relation between art and precarity has been recently investigated by G. VILAR, Precariedad, estética y 
política, Almería, Círculo Rojo 2017. 
